I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be descriptivist rather than revisionary, that is, that it should describe how we think about musical works, rather than how they are independently of our thought about them. I argue that if we take descriptivism seriously then, first, we should be sceptical of artontological arguments that appeal to independent metaphysical respectability and, second, we should give 'fictionalism' about musical works -the theory that they do not exist -more serious consideration than it is usually accorded.
…when you encounter certain things in the world, the evidence for certain things, you realize that you have come upon somethin that you may very well not be equal to and I think that this is one of them things. When you've said that it's real and not just in your head I'm not all that sure what it is you have said. 1 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUSICAL ONTOLOGY
It is not uncommon to view debate over the ontology of music, at least in the world of analytic philosophy, as having been kick-started by the publication of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art in 1968. 2 The ontology of music Goodman proposed is notable in at least two respects: (1) it is nominalist, identifying works with sets of concreta, specifically scores and performances, and (2) it is revisionary, in the sense that Goodman placed such a high premium on achieving what he considered to be the right kind of philosophical theory that he was explicitly prepared to revise beliefs quite central to musical practice -such as that a performance of a work might contain a wrong note -in
order to preserve what he saw as the features of a good philosophical theory.
In response to Goodman, most musical ontologists have attempted to provide a less revisionary account of what a musical work is, and of the relationship between a work and a performance of it. Part of how this has been attempted, resulting in a major strand in the history of musical ontology, is through the rejection of Goodman's nominalism in favour of some other kind of metaphysical theory. This is one way to account for the diversity of ontological theories that have been defended since Goodman.
Most notably, there have been two varieties of action theorists and several varieties of realists, falling into two main camps: the Platonists and 'creationists'. 3 (Though there   3 have also been eliminativists and idealists about musical works, these theories have been more discussed than defended since Goodman.) Most recently the wheel has come full circle, and there has been a resurgence of interest in nominalism. 4 On good days, all these theories seem to me to be the 'embarrassment of riches' Amie Thomasson has characterized them as, 5 though on bad days they seem like burnt-out wrecks drifting on the ontological sea.
I tend to see the early theorists in this area, most notably Goodman, Richard
Wollheim, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, as approaching the ontology of art as just one more instance of the problem of universals. Musical works, they note, appear to be 'generic'
entities -entities that admit of multiple instances. What kinds of things, then, could they be? The familiar answers are pretty clearly reflected in the list I have just gone through:
they could be collections of concrete objects (nominalism), or abstracta that exist more or less independently (Platonism or creationism), or maybe they don't really exist at all (eliminativism), or only in our heads (idealism). Thinking about musical works in these terms gives rise to some familiar problems. For instance, if you think of a work as a kind of universal instantiated in performances, then it can seem quite a problem to explain how it is that a performance might instantiate that universal without containing all the notes that are definitive of the work.
There is a parallel history of musical ontology since Goodman, however, wherein one can discern a growing awareness that one might reject Goodman's revisionism independently of his nominalism. That is, there has been a growing interest in, or unrest about, the proper methodology for doing the ontology of music and the other arts. This strand of theorizing grew out of an interest in the nature of performance, and musical 4 practice more generally. 6 One of the main ideas that arose out of this work was that there must be some sort of intentional relation between a performance and the work it is of.
This seems a promising route for a solution to the 'wrong-note problem' since we might hope to find success conditions on having an intention such as to play Bach's first solo sonata for violin that are less demanding than the identity conditions of that piece. That is, you might perform a piece by seriously, or reasonably, intending to play it, and yet fail to get all the notes right. 7 One reason this is an interesting development is that it doesn't appeal, at least on its face, to any particular position in what I have come to call the 'fundamentalist debate', that is, the debate about which fundamental ontological category musical works belong to, and yet it solves one of the problems that the participants in that debate are interested in.
A nice case-study for this 'dual history' of musical ontology is Jerrold Levinson It is this principle that I would like to call into question.
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The main objection I have to this principle is that we do have ontological intuitions about artworks that are relatively independent of our other intuitions about artontological intuitions that are rooted in our practice. This is evident in all the prima facie counterexamples people raise when first confronted with, as we say, counterintuitive ontological proposals such as Davies's. We think of a painting, for instance, as being spatially located, made of paint and canvas, capable of surviving beyond its artist's life and then being destroyed at some later time, and capable of being bought and sold in its entirety. We think of a musical work as coming into existence with its composition, being capable of being performed in its entirety an indefinite number of times, and being heard in its entirety at any one of these performances. 17 That we have these beliefs about artworks is evident not only when we ask people about them, or when we are doing art ontology, but in just about any critical discourse, and much artistic practice. An artist typically thinks of herself as selling the whole of one of her sculptures, I take it, and sometimes wishes she had not parted with it so soon. A composer cares whether you have heard a complete performance of his piece. Critics and public alike mourn the loss of a painting in a fire. Now, as pretty much any ontologist of art will agree, these intuitions are revisable in the light of some philosophical theorizing, in part because most people admit we can't consistently hold on to all our intuitions. 18 But the point here is that our ontological intuitions are part and parcel of our pre-theoretical beliefs about art, and must thus be taken into account along with our other intuitions. To exclude precisely our ontological intuitions from the data to be explained when we are engaged in the project of art ontology seems perverse. To draw an analogy: in working on a definition of art, a theorist may have recourse to some claims about the value of art, but it would be peculiar if she set aside our intuitions about the extension of the term 'art'. She might suggest revising our pre-theoretical intuitions about that extension, in the process of working out her definition, but to exclude such intuitions from the start would be to ignore the central data to be explained.
III. AN EVEN MORE PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINT
Guy Rohrbaugh has recently argued that we ought to do art ontology along the lines suggested by Davies, but he acknowledges that part of the data to be explained by a theory of art ontology is precisely our ontological intuitions. Thus we can see his methodology as an extension of Davies's 'pragmatic constraint'. 19 In general, Rohrbaugh argues that
[a] properly conceived ontology of art is one which provides a metaphysical framework flexible enough to represent accurately a wide variety of phenomena and to permit the expression of heterogeneous critical views, views which must be evaluated in their own terms. Ontologies of art are beholden to our artistic practices…and…critical debates are part of the practices to be captured. (pp.
178-9)
In particular, he claims we have pre-theoretical intuitions that add up to a fairly robust This widening of the scope of his conclusions is a pre-emptive strike on Rohrbaugh's part against objections that the features of artworks he describes can be accounted for by a more conservative ontology, such as a traditional nominalist or realist ontology of art. 20 Rohrbaugh claims that rejecting his new category of historical individuals will have two unacceptable consequences. First, we will need to paraphrase away not just some central claims about artworks, but also central claims about species, words, clubs and so on, all of which Rohrbaugh suggests are historical individuals.
Second, we will lose the account of the distinction between the real and the unreal that Rohrbaugh argues we gain with his view.
One question we must ask if we are interested in the methodology of art ontology, however, is whether such a pre-emptive strike should be necessary at all. Rohrbaugh seems to be in the same position Jerrold Levinson was in once he had argued that musical works must be creatable, finely individuable, and capable of possessing instrumental properties essentially. Must one go on and provide a further metaphysical defence of the category posited, beyond the 'pragmatic' one rooted in artistic practice? Rhetorically, of course, the more defences the better. 21 If one can pre-empt objections from both the artistic side and the metaphysical side, one is in a more secure position. But this muddies the methodological waters. If purely metaphysical questions are beside the point, because
art-ontological disputes are to be decided on the basis of practice, then we ought to acknowledge that fact. This would simplify our task in terms of which objections we need to consider, but would be even more helpful in ruling whole methodologies out of court.
IV. DESCRIPTIVISM AND REVISIONISM
One useful way of approaching these issues is through Peter Strawson's distinction between descriptive metaphysics, which 'is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world' and revisionary metaphysics, which 'is concerned to produce a better structure', presumably one which describes more accurately the world as it is in itself, independently of our thought about it. 23 Strawson himself was concerned with the 'most fundamental' concepts and categories, the 'commonplaces of the least refined thinking; and…yet the indispensible core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings', 24 but if the ontology of art is constrained by ordinary artistic practice, then ontologists of art are also (or should be) engaged in a more descriptive than revisionary project. (The methodologies of Davies and Rohrbaugh, discussed above, are clearly descriptive in this sense.) Even if this is acknowledged, however, there is a question of how descriptive to be.
Although Strawson mentions that it is unlikely any metaphysician has been wholly descriptive or revisionary, 25 it seems to me that we should think of theorists not as partly the one and partly the other, but as falling on a spectrum between two polar extremes. 26 At the descriptive end of the spectrum is the particularist, who argues that there is no such thing as the ontological nature of the artwork, the musical work, the classical musical work for performance, or any kind of artwork. We must look at the particular details in any given case, describing each work as it is, rather than fitting them all, or any group of them, into a Procrustean ontological theory. 27 For the extreme descriptivist, to describe the work as it is is simply to report how people think of it. One reason no one tends to occupy this extreme position is widespread agreement that people often think about things in a confused way. People who know nothing about a particular artwork, or the tradition in which it is produced, often form an opinion about it more quickly than those who are aware of its complexities. Since this situation gives rise to contradictory claims about any particular artwork, unless we are to revise the laws of logic, or embrace an ontological relativism about artworks, extreme descriptivism is an untenable position. Most ontologists of art, then, first restrict the judgments taken into 13 account to those made by people with an understanding of the tradition in which the work was produced. Then, since even among such people there may be disagreements, most ontologists appeal explicitly or implicitly to a rational reconstruction of, or reflective equilibrium amongst the various expert judgments. Again, we have seen this above in the methodologies of both Davies and Rohrbaugh. This is already to move away from the descriptivist end of the spectrum.
As we move down the line, towards the revisionary end, we encounter ontologists who give up more and more of our expert artistic judgements in the interests of a better theory of the way artworks really are, independently of how we think about them. What counts as a better theory, apart from accounting for the data of the artistic practice in question? Of course there are the usual general theoretical ideals that are easy to list, but difficult to explain or defend: unity, simplicity, perhaps even beauty or elegance. But apart from these, many ontologists of art impose the further constraint on themselves that the kinds of entities they appeal to must be metaphysically respectable. This 'metaphysical constraint', as we might call it, is sometimes appealed to very explicitly, and made to shoulder much of the burden of defending an art-ontological theory, while in other cases it is appealed to implicitly, and considered just one constraint among many.
We have already seen a couple of examples of the latter approach in the work of A defender of the metaphysical constraint might respond as follows. He could point out that the kinds of 'metaphysical' debate I am suggesting we might do without are in fact correctly described as descriptivist. The point of descriptivism, it might be said, is to change not the way we go about metaphysics, but how we conceive of what we are doing. Instead of having the rather surprising goal of figuring out from our armchairs how the world is independently of our thought about it, we should acknowledge that we are trying to figure out how we ultimately conceive of the world. So it is a mistake to draw an analogy between musical works and fundamental ontology, on the one hand, and furniture and physics on the other. Physics is revisionary -it cares about how things really are, not about how we think about them -but fundamental metaphysics may well be as descriptive as musical ontology. Thus our ontological theories of music should cohere with our fundamental ontological theories -we can radically revise our intuitions about the ontological nature of musical works while being thoroughgoing descriptivists.
While I am sympathetic to the premises of this argument, I reject the conclusion.
The fact, if it is one, that fundamental metaphysics is descriptive does not directly imply that our 'higher-order' ontologies must mesh with our fundamental ontology. 30 In part this is because (pace David Davies) those involved in the arts think about the nature of artworks quite a lot, and often quite explicitly. By contrast, few people other than metaphysicians think about the nature of objects and their properties, say. Thus, there is no reason to expect that the way we think about musical works will mesh with, for instance, the way we think about electrons having particular spins. Furthermore, though musical works must have some fundamental nature, if they exist at all, it does not follow that they will be metaphysically fundamental in the same sense as substances or tropes might be. Musical works get made in complex social situations -they are cultural artefacts. Part of what this means is that their nature and properties depend not only on individual minds but on complex interactions between many different minds, and thus they will be at least as high up the ontological ladder as minds. 31 It is surely something like this thought that is behind the idea that musical ontology is ineliminably descriptive, because if this is correct, then how musical works are depends upon how people think about them.
An alternative response would be to defend revisionism about general metaphysics. Consideration of such a defence is beyond the scope of this essay, fortunately for me. But I hope it is clear that the replies given to the previous response are equally applicable here. The fact, if it is one, that fundamental metaphysics is revisionary does not directly imply that musical ontology is revisionary. Moreover, the considerations given above about the dependence of musical works on complex social practices give us reason to suspect that musical ontology is descriptive whether or not fundamental metaphysics is.
Finally, one might explicitly defend revisionism about musical ontology.
Considering such a defence is also beyond the scope of this essay. I will just point out here that a return to revisionism would be a return to the bad old Goodman days -the days when artistic practice played no more role in our art-ontological theories than delimiting a set of phenomena to be investigated. If the ontology of art has changed for the better since those days, in becoming more answerable to artistic practice, then whatever reasons we have for approving of those changes will be reasons to reject artontological revisionism.
In sum, if art ontology is a truly descriptivist field, then ontological theories of other domains, such as fundamental metaphysics, are beside the point. As mentioned above, we may be justified in thinking that our ontological theories of art (as with our theories of everything else) must obey the laws of logic, but if they are truly descriptive they are not beholden to anything else, apart from our artistic practice, in ways already discussed. If the best rational reconstruction of the ontological conception of artworks implicit in artistic practice is that they are X, Y, and Z, then artworks are in fact the kind of thing that is X, Y, and Z.
V. DESCRIPTIVISM AND FICTIONALISM
It would be nice to be able to explain how it is that our musical practices determine the fundamental ontological nature of musical works. With such a theory in hand, we could truly embrace descriptivism about musical ontology and eschew the more technical, apparently revisionist discussions of musical ontology so prevalent in the literature.
One might think that Amie Thomasson's recent work on the reference of art-kind terms provides a way of integrating a descriptivist approach to art ontology with a concern for fundamental metaphysics. 32 In short, Thomasson argues that if we refer with art-kind terms at all, it is to things with the basic ontological properties that we conceive those kinds as possessing. A problem arises if there are no such things, though. In that case, Thomasson claims that we refer to the closest ontological competitor. However, if we fail to refer to what we thought we referred to with some art-kind term, it is not clear that we must be referring instead to the closest competitor to the ontological conception implicit in our practice; we might simply fail to refer. Furthermore, if we do refer to some closest competitor, it seems likely that in our attempts to find that competitor we will be led away from descriptivism to the kind of revisionism we would like to avoid. 33 Another place it is tempting to look for such an explanation is the literature on 'social construction'. For there we find discussions of how it is that by merely acting in certain ways, we bring it about that certain things are (correctly) classified in certain ways. Unfortunately, for our purposes, most of this work is concerned not with the construction of things, but with the construction of concepts or categories of things, or, at best, the attribution of new properties to pre-existing things. 34 Since the major issue in fundamental musical ontology is the nature of the things themselves -musical worksthis avenue is not as promising as it might at first appear.
There is another approach which I believe merits more serious consideration than it is usually afforded. This view is usually labelled 'fictionalism', but in the interests of approaching it with fresh eyes, I will introduce it through a similar theory about language recently defended by Georges Rey. Rey's central claim is that 'standard linguistic entities' (SLEs), such as phonemes, words, and sentences, are 'intentional inexistents'. 35 What he means by this is that (a) there are no such things, either outside the mind in the concrete or abstract realms, or inside the mind, but that (b) there is a quite robust shared system of representations of such things. Part of the motivation for the view is that the most successful linguistic theories refer to such things as sentences with complex grammatical structure, yet at the same time linguistics provides evidence that there are no token sentences with such structure. 36 The ultimate explanation of how we communicate by means of sentences when there don't seem to be any, strictly speaking, is that we are engaged in a kind of folie à deux (or à n, for the n speakers of a common language): the speaker has the illusion of producing an SLE that the hearer has the illusion of It is worth considering whether musical works may be such 'intentional inexistents'. We discover the kinds of properties musical works must have (creatability, and so on) by investigating musical practice, just as we discover what properties sentences must have by investigating linguistic practice. While the claim that there are no musical works with these properties is not as well-established as the parallel linguistic claim, the ongoing and seemingly intractable disputes about the fundamental metaphysical nature of musical works seems akin to the linguists' evidence that there are no sentences with the requisite structure. 38 More loosely, the ways musical ideas are disseminated through works is analogous to the way ideas are disseminated through language: They are set down in writing, and communicated through 'utterances'
(performances), none of which need match the structure of the work perfectly. Certainly there is a robust system of representing works in our compositional, performative, and 20 critical musical practices. In short, it would make no difference if there were no musical works, strictly speaking, as long as we all continued to behave as if there were.
It might seem puzzling at first that pursuing descriptivism could result in such an unintuitive theory. We seem to be in a similar dialectical position to that of David Davies, according to the account I gave above. But this is not so. If we truly embrace descriptivism, we embrace the idea that when we do musical ontology, what we describe is our conceptions of musical works, rather than the things themselves. There is a certain irony in the idea that if we take descriptivism, and thus our conceptions of musical works, seriously, we should conclude that those works have no existence beyond our conceptions of them. But this irony should be softened by the security our conceptions of musical works gain against revisionist attacks.
Given the descriptivist retreat to explication of our concepts of musical works, should we be agnostic or quietist about their existence, rather asserting their inexistence?
To answer this question in full would require at least another essay, but there is one basic reason, analogous to that Rey has for asserting the inexistence of SLEs, to prefer 'atheism' about musical works to agnosticism. In essence it is an appeal to Occam's razor. If we are not required to posit the existence of musical works as we conceive them in order to account for the data our ontological theory must explain, then we should not. 39 Having briefly set out this variety of fictionalism about musical works, let me distinguish it from some views with which it might be confused. First, this view should be clearly distinguished from eliminativism. Eliminativists about Xs argue that we ought to stop talking about Xs, and start talking about Ys, which were really what we were talking about all along, albeit confusedly. 40 Rey does not suggest this for linguistic entities, nor does the fictionalist for musical works. Part of the reason for this is that, on the view proposed, while there aren't really any Xs, there aren't any Ys, either. If there aren't any musical works, we are getting along fine without them, and there is no reason to change this happy state of affairs.
Second, fictionalism should be distinguished from nominalism, both narrowly and broadly construed. In the narrow sense, nominalist proposals about musical ontology are close to eliminativist, or at least reductionist, proposals. The nominalist seeks to identify works with things, such as scores and performances, or sets thereof, that are more familiar to us than what is posited by other theories, such as types or historical individuals. Again, we are getting along fine talking about musical works in addition to performances, scores, and so on, not to mention the problems that arise when we try to reduce work-talk to performance-talk, and so on. In the broad sense, nominalists are those who attempt to do away with all abstract objects. This is not the place to go into that dispute, but I should at least note that the arguments for the intentional inexistence of linguistic entities and musical works do not warrant such a broad conclusion. It is not at all clear that the arguments for the inexistence of phonemes or musical works could be extended to numbers or properties. 41 Third, the view should be distinguished from idealism. The claim is not that musical works are mental entities, any more than the claim that there are no witches is the claim that witches are our thoughts about witches. What is 'ideal' (i.e., mental or psychological) according to the proposal is only our thoughts about musical works. But this doesn't distinguish musical works from anything else. The distinctive claim is that there are no musical works, ideal or otherwise, but that we have thoughts 'about them' 22 nonetheless. This kind of talk always has an air of paradox about it, but there is nothing more problematic here than our usual 'references to' the Greek gods, witches, and so on. 42 Of course, one might object that such reference is problematic enough. All I can do here is suggest that if we can talk about witches without there being such things -real, abstract, ideal, or otherwise -we can do the same for musical works. We ought not to talk seriously about witches because of the pernicious social results of such talk. But though similar arguments about musical works may be possible, our ongoing musical practices are presumably rather valuable, and thus there is no need to change those practices to bring them into accord with the inexistence of musical works (whatever that would entail!).
Need or no, you might wonder if musical practice could remain unchanged, at least for those who have embraced the theory. For surely if you don't believe there are any musical works, you can't seriously intend to play one, for instance. The fictionalist can first respond that it will be very difficult even for himself to take this theory seriously in practice, so thoroughly enmeshed are we in our conceptual scheme about music.
(Think of the analogous difficulty of expressing explicitly the fictional status of characters and events in a film under discussion.) But, second, even if one could keep the theory at the forefront of one's mind, all one would have to do would be to explicitly intend to produce a sound event (or whatever) that would be taken by a knowledgeable listener to be a performance of a particular work. Similarly for the philosopher of language who can't stop thinking about the intentional inexistence of SLEs. She can still communicate with other people, even though she knows that she is not really producing token sentences with the structure her linguistic theory 'requires' of them. 
